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ABSTRACT  5	  
In a rapid rural appraisal conducted in 2012 in the Senegalese Sahel, agropastoralists of Thiel 6	  
expressed their need for technical and scientific support in peanut value chain development. 7	  
Value chain analysis assessed the performance of the stakeholders. Multiple correspondence 8	  
analysis clarified power relationships among them. Social network analysis facilitated the 9	  
understanding of social and technical relationships inside the particular node of 10	  
agropastoralists. Results show that the peanut crop is both a source of cash flow (marketing) 11	  
and a pillar of food (basic consumption) and feed (by-products) security. This paper also 12	  
highlights a lack of convenient economic environments, mutual assistance, capacity transfer 13	  
and knowledge sharing on the best agricultural practices among agropastoralists, despite their 14	  
weak production performance. Agropastoralists have no influence in the peanut value chain 15	  
and are dependent on decisions from other actors. Technical support and knowledge sharing 16	  
appear to be key for agropastoralists to control and adopt agricultural innovations. 17	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INTRODUCTION 31	  
In the Sub-Saharan agricultural sector, diversification consists of a gradual movement away 32	  
from subsistence food crops toward additional market-oriented crops (Parthasarathy, Joshi, 33	  
Shravan and Kavery, 2008). It has long been accepted that rural producers adopt 34	  
diversification economic activities in situations with high levels of uncertainty and in the 35	  
absence of contingency markets (Berhanu, Colman and Fayissa, 1996) to manage both 36	  
predictable and unpredictable flows of income (Robinson and Barry, 1987) and to secure rural 37	  
livelihood systems (Niehof, 2004; Wane, Camara, Ancey, Joly and Kâ, 2009). Farmer 38	  
motivations to diversify are also specifically addressed through research activities on 39	  
diversification, risk and income (Bezu, Barrett and Holden, 2012; Baird and Gray, 2014); 40	  
food insecurity mitigation (Michler and Josephson, 2015); climate change coping strategies 41	  
(Di Falco and Veronesi, 2013a, b; Phillipo, Bushesha and Zebedayo, 2015); and/or violent 42	  
conflicts (Paul, Shonchoy and Dabalen, 2015). Similarly, Sahelian agropastoralists must 43	  
diversify their economic activities as they encounter global challenges—including climate 44	  
change—as well as economic, social and political crises (Ickowicz, Ancey, Corniaux, 45	  
Duteurtre, Poccard-Chappuis, Touré, Vall and Wane, 2012).  46	  
Annually, Sahelian pastoral households also deal with extreme seasonal variability, leading to 47	  
spatiotemporal and asymmetrical distributions of resources. They mainly use various forms of 48	  
mobility recognised as sustainable strategies of herd management. Due to the threat of acute 49	  
damage to pastoral productive assets, the environment and individual livelihoods by the 50	  
aforementioned constraints, Sahelian households use livestock markets to balance short-term 51	  
consumption needs and long-term herd building strategies to meet future consumption needs 52	  
(Wane, Camara, Ancey, Joly and Kâ, 2009; Fadiga, 2013). Thus, they primarily attempt to 53	  
secure their livestock production systems (Tran, 2011), as well as their socioeconomic and 54	  
cultural heritage. In addition, diversification of income and food sources remains a prevalent 55	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ex-ante uncertainty-reduced management strategy to secure the living conditions of Sahelian 56	  
agropastoralists. On the other hand, ex-post alternative mechanisms are used to smooth 57	  
consumption, but they remain random, like the mechanisms of most peasant households in 58	  
developing countries (Valvidia, Dunn and Jetté, 1996).  59	  
However, in the Sahel, diversification strategies in the crop sector continue to be treated as 60	  
secondary modes of production. In addition, gap-efficiency analysis along commodity value 61	  
chains remains very weak. The diversification of agropastoral product value chains in the 62	  
Sahel is similar to the notion of the A-System, which was initially highlighted by Ruben, van 63	  
Boekel, Van Tilburg and Trienekens (2007). The A-System is characterised by traditional 64	  
production systems with multiple small producers and intermediaries, local value chains, 65	  
weak market information systems, longer transportation distance and time and complex 66	  
distribution networks.  67	  
Accordingly, based on the concept of productivity measured as the economic output of a 68	  
combination of production factors—including labour, capital and other factors—this paper 69	  
emphasises the importance of the term “other factors” in the Sahelian contexts by analysing 70	  
their complex relationships and the induced incentives that exist in agropastoral product value 71	  
chains. The main objective of this paper is to better describe this complexity, identify 72	  
bottlenecks and highlight alternative interventions that significantly impact the position of 73	  
agropastoralists in non-livestock value chains. By doing this, we also address the risk and 74	  
uncertainty management decisions of the Sahelian agropastoralists by using social network 75	  
and multiple correspondence analysis approaches in an unprecedented way. An unexpected 76	  
finding is the predominance of strong social relationships, with a tiny technical knowledge 77	  
network among actors.   78	  
This paper begins with an overview of value chain analysis. This Section 1 focuses on the 79	  
methodological challenge of quantitatively assessing the performance of different 80	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stakeholders. It then provides a justification for the use of social network analysis to better 81	  
understand relationships between agropastoralists and to explore new ways to improve the 82	  
agropastoralists’ position in non-livestock value chains. Section 2 describes a case study in 83	  
Senegalese agropastoral areas, where producers clearly expressed the desire to be technically 84	  
and scientifically supported in peanut value chain improvement. Section 3 develops a 85	  
discussion on the main findings and shows how groups of individuals differ based on 86	  
influential and non-influential factors. Finally, a conclusion outlines alternative interventions 87	  
that could support agropastoralists in adopting innovations and best practices. 88	  
I- AREA OF STUDY, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, METHOD DESCRIPTION AND 89	  
SAMPLING STRATEGY 90	  
After a presentation of the area of study, the peanut value chain is mapped, followed by a 91	  
description of the conceptual framework, the methodological approach and the household 92	  
sampling strategy for primary data collection. 93	  
Area of study 94	  
Value chain analysis increasingly requires a minimum amount of statistical data. In the Sahel, 95	  
data collection requirements were broadly highlighted by a large study from the World 96	  
Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralism (Hatfield and Davies, 2006). Moving towards 97	  
quantifying value chain analysis is highly recommended (Rich, Ross, Baker and Negassa, 98	  
2011) to better evaluate the performance and impact of innovative interventions, although 99	  
network complexity is already qualitatively characterised in livestock systems (Riisgaard, 100	  
Bolwig, Ponte, du Toit, Halberg and Matose, 2010).  101	  
Our study was conducted in 2013 in the agropastoral area of Thiel, located in the south of the 102	  
Senegalese Sahel on the edge of the peanut basin (Figure 1). This main peanut cultivation 103	  
area extends along the north-south strip of 220 km and the east-west strip of 200 km. It 104	  
represents a third of the farmland and is a source of employment for many households in the 105	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region. In 2012, peanut production in Senegal declined significantly. In this context, the 106	  
agropastoralists of Thiel produced 270 tons of peanuts, averaging 1.9 tons per encampment. 107	  
This production remains too marginal compared to national peanut production.  108	  
In terms of scientific research, there is an increasing consensus concerning the need to provide 109	  
statistical evidence to better understand complex agropastoral production systems and 110	  
livelihoods, even though the mobility of actors, informal relationships and non-market drivers 111	  
do not facilitate such an orientation. 112	  
In Senegal, the main agropastoral and pastoral production system is concentrated in the Ferlo 113	  
region, which is 67,610 km² and makes up approximately a third of the national territory 114	  
(Touré, Diop and Diouf, 2003). With a surface area of 1,031.46 km2, the agropastoral unit of 115	  
Thiel is located in the silvopasture reserve of Ferlo, which is approximately 60 km southeast 116	  
of Dahra, the largest livestock market in Senegal. Its closeness to the Senegal groundnut basin 117	  
and the advancement of the agricultural front strengthen the land tenure competition between 118	  
farmers and breeders. However, crop-livestock integration is increasingly observed in the 119	  
rural community of Thiel. Thus, during our investigations in 2013, 92 percent of household 120	  
heads identified themselves as agropastoralists, and 1 percent of respondents reported 121	  
exclusively practicing agriculture, whereas in surveys conducted in 2006–2007, only 48.1 122	  
percent of household heads identified themselves as agropastoralists (Wane, Camara, Ancey, 123	  
Joly and Kâ, 2009). Crop-livestock integration facilitates cross-fertilization because crop 124	  
residues feed animals, which in turn contribute to soil fertility through organic matter transfer. 125	  
Figure 1 – The agropastoral rural community of Thiel 126	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 127	  
Source: GLCn-FAO, 2005, Touré 2014 128	  
The ethnic composition in the rural community of Thiel is diverse and includes three major 129	  
groups: the Fulani, the Seereer and the Wolofs. 130	  
Conceptual framework: Peanut value chain mapping 131	  
The “value chain” concept is similar to the notions of productive chains, the French “filières,” 132	  
marketing chains, supply chains and distribution chains (Webber and Labaste, 2009). 133	  
	   7	  
Basically, the value chain is the full range of value-adding activities required to bring a 134	  
product or service through the different phases of production, including procurement of raw 135	  
materials and other inputs, assembly, physical transformation, acquisition of required services 136	  
(such as transport or cooling) and ultimate response to consumer demand (Kaplinsky and 137	  
Morris, 2002). 138	  
Farmers and agropastoralists are the first link in the peanut value chain in Thiel. Another 139	  
important link in this chain are the public and private support unit firms that provide inputs 140	  
and buy back the peanuts produced. Traditionally, government authorities sell subsidised seed 141	  
to producers, then collection points are set up at harvest time to buy peanuts in exchange for 142	  
vouchers redeemable in the future. Other actors in the value chain include women—usually 143	  
the wives of household heads—who produce oil, peanut paste and food concentrate from 144	  
peanuts that are purchased or harvested. In 30 percent of the encampments in Thiel, women 145	  
perform this processing activity.  146	  
Another important value chain node is the traders, who buy large amounts of peanuts from the 147	  
producers for resale in markets in Touba, the flagship city located 100 km from Thiel and the 148	  
economic peanut hub in Senegal. Much of the production is sold in Thiel. Traders process the 149	  
peanut seeds to remove mould and pests before reselling. Transactions on peanuts also 150	  
involve a large group of players that are very active, such as middlemen who buy and shell 151	  
peanuts. These traders are often based in Touba, and they also sell seeds, as well as the 152	  
derivative products used for animal feed and energy products. These traders also constitute an 153	  
important link in the value chain and offer support services to producers trying to sell to 154	  
Touba. Usually, they have trucks that can carry 40 peanut bags from 30 to 50 kg, for a 155	  
transportation cost of 1,000 XOF6 per bag.  156	  
 157	  
 158	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 XOF represents the ISO currency code for the West African CFA franc. In June 30, 2012: 1 XOF = 
0.0019305381 USD. 
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Figure 2 – The peanut value chain mapping of Thiel 159	  
Source: authors 160	  
Note the existence of two terminal markets that shorten the marketing chain of peanuts: the 161	  
local market of the rural community, where most collectors and processors sell shelled 162	  
peanuts, oil and peanut butter, and the assembly market of Touba, where the middlemen trade 163	  
only unshelled peanuts. 164	  
Method description 165	  
The limitations of the traditional value chain approach are most notable in agropastoral value 166	  
chain analysis. Such analysis is supposed to assist in both the invention of mechanisms of data 167	  
collection adapted to the characteristics of pastoral activities (mobility, informal activities, 168	  
self-centred economy and self-bounded rationality) and in the intelligent use of tools, such as 169	  
social network analysis. Challenges within the social network can be identified by analysing 170	  
vulnerabilities within the network, thus helping to move to a more resilient system (Alary, 171	  
Messad, Daoud, Aboul-Naga, Osman, Bonnet and Torrand, 2016). The role of networks as 172	  
facilitators of the coordination and distribution of productive resources could be analysed by 173	  
using social network analysis as a comprehensive framework for investigating network 174	  
phenomena through primary data collection.  175	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For the agropastoralists of Thiel, the main hypothesis that should be tested is whether there 176	  
are strong links among social relationships, technical cooperation and knowledge sharing. 177	  
The two most important parameters in social network analysis are the individual factors called 178	  
“nodes” or “vertices” and their links or relationships, also called “edges” or “ties.” Thus, a 179	  
social network R (N, g) is defined by a group of nodes: 𝑁 = 1,2, …    ,𝑛 and real-valued 𝑛𝑥𝑛 180	  
matrix g. Each line 𝑖 and each column 𝑗 of this matrix represents an individual node, and their 181	  
intersection 𝑔!" indicates whether there is a relationship between them; 𝑔!" takes a binary 182	  
value according to the existence (1) or absence (0) of a link. In addition, there is an important 183	  
notion of distance that characterises the position of one node in relation to another. This 184	  
distance between two nodes—also called the geodesic—determines relevant indicators, such 185	  
as the density measures (which are easily calculable) and the centrality measures (which are 186	  
slightly more complex to determine) (Gomez, Figueira and Eusebio, 2013). Whereas density 187	  
measures highlight the connection level of the network by comparing the present links and 188	  
those possible if all nodes were linked, centrality measures determine what makes one node 189	  
more prominent than another (Gomez, Figueira and Eusebio, 2013).  190	  
Centrality refers to the importance and the influence of a node in terms of the numbers of 191	  
links that the node has. Centrality indicators can be elaborated to reflect the multidimensional 192	  
character of this notion: The degree centrality considers which important nodes have many 193	  
relationships or links (edges) with others (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The degree centrality 194	  
is equal to the number of neighbours that a node has. In the case of an oriented social 195	  
network, one distinguishes between in-degree and out-degree measures. In-degree indicates 196	  
the number of links that nodes receive and is interpreted as a prestige indicator, and out-197	  
degree indicates the number of relationships from the node and represents the influence of the 198	  
node. Dividing by 𝑛 − 1 should standardize these indicators. The betweenness centrality 199	  
considers that the importance of a node depends on the frequency with which it serves as an 200	  
	   10	  
intermediate between two nodes. Therefore, a vertex has power if it stands on the geodesic of 201	  
two actors. However, this power is lowered if the geodesic of these two nodes is not unique; 202	  
in this case, there is another canal from which the information can pass. Formally, the 203	  
importance of a node 𝑖 is measured by dividing the number of times that 𝑖 stands on the 204	  
geodesic between two nodes 𝑗 and k by the number of geodesics of these two nodes.  205	  
Thus, the betweenness of a node is calculated as 206	   𝑰 =     𝑷𝒊  (𝒌𝒋)𝑷(𝒌𝒋)𝒌,      𝒋!𝒊   (1) 207	  
with 𝑃!  (𝑘𝑗) being the number of geodesics between k and j that pass by 𝑖 et 𝑃(𝑘𝑗) being the 208	  
total number of geodesics between k and j. 209	  
The standard version of this indicator is 210	  
𝑰𝑺 = 𝟐       𝑷𝒊  (𝒌𝒋)𝑷(𝒌𝒋)𝒌,      𝒋!𝒊𝒏𝟐!𝟑𝒏!𝟐   (2) 211	  
The closeness centrality measures the distance between one node and other nodes of the 212	  
social network (Beauchamp, 1965). It is equal to the inverse of the average geodesic between 213	  
this node and the other. The closer a node is to other nodes, the shorter the average distance 214	  
between one node and the others. Thus, the formula for the closeness centrality of a node 𝑖 is 215	   𝑷 = 𝟏𝒅𝒊𝒋𝒊𝒋𝒏!𝟏  (3) 216	  
with 𝑑!" equaling the number of links in the geodesic between 𝑖 and 𝑗7.  217	  
Relationships between peanut value chain actors should be further characterised by the 218	  
analysis of the influence of each of them (i.e., the power relationships). In this paper, this 219	  
influence is studied through three criteria: dependence on markets, information asymmetry 220	  
and pricing power. The power relationships in the value chain will be located through 221	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The analysis could be technically extended to consider bi-dimensional cost-distance communication aspects 
between two nodes and to select from detailed information about non-dominated vectors (Gomez, Figueira and 
Eusebio, 2013). However, this is outside the scope of this exploratory paper. 
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simultaneous examination of these three criteria and a multiple correspondence analysis 222	  
(MCA).   223	  
Table 1 - Procedures for determining the level of influence of value-chain actors 224	  
Dimension Variables Questions asked Modalities 
Setting power 
of the price 
qa35 How are input prices fixed? 
Regardless of him, by 
consensus, by himself, by 
market prices 
qa37 Are you able to influence input prices? Yes, No 
qa41 How output prices are fixed? 
Regardless of him, by 
consensus, by himself, by 
market prices 
qa43 Are you able to influence output prices? Yes, No 
Dependence on 
market 
qa38 Do you have to buy inputs even when prices are high? Yes, No 
qa44 Do you have to sell outputs even when prices are low? Yes, No 
qa49 Do you have alternative possibilities to sell even if your major clients don’t buy? Yes, No 
Asymmetric 
information 
qa47 Are you able to control the market? Yes, No 
qa48 Do you know the final destination of your product? Yes, No 
Sources: authors 225	  
The first approach is traditional; it only allows the identification of groups of influential 226	  
actors. It does not give details about the individuals that influence or the level of their power. 227	  
Thus, the concepts of distance and dispersion between two groups of individuals, the distance 228	  
between two modalities, the distance between a modality and the centre of gravity, and 229	  
barycentric relationships between groups of individuals and modalities allow an initial 230	  
overview of the degree of influence of each stakeholder. However, this does not necessarily 231	  
serve to identify power disparities inside each group of stakeholders. The second approach 232	  
provides an indicator that calculates the influence of particularly influential individuals as 233	  
follows: 234	   𝑰𝒊 = 𝟏𝑸 𝑾𝒋𝒒𝒋∈𝒋𝒒   𝒒!𝑸𝒒!𝟏 𝒌𝒊𝒋 (4) 235	  
with 𝑊!!  being the weight accorded to the modality 𝑗  of the question 𝑞 and 𝑘!"  being the 236	  
answer given to the question by the individual 𝑖. The indicator of influence is the sum of the 237	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modality weights declared by individuals. Following this, to classify individuals according to 238	  
their degree of influence, we developed a threshold of influence calculated as follows: 239	   𝑺 = 𝒎𝒂𝒙(𝑰𝒏𝒐𝒏!𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕 ∗𝑴𝒏𝒐𝒏!𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕) +𝒎𝒊𝒏(𝑰𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕 ∗𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕) (5) 240	  
with 𝑀! being the weight of the class 𝑖. 241	  
Sampling strategy 242	  
The livelihoods of Ferlo’s herders are so specific that it is useful to specify the contents given 243	  
to the investigation units. The pastoral family does not limit itself to the parents and their direct 244	  
descendants. There are four types of residency units in the Sahel: (1) villages (in Fulani: 245	  
nokuu), or places where physical presence is important; (2) pastoral household activities, which 246	  
allow us to identify the concessions (guuré in plural, wuro in singular) that are large units of 247	  
residence; (3) encampments (gallédji in plural, gallé in singular) that are socio-economic units 248	  
of people (with blood ties or not) who totally or partially combine their resources to foster 249	  
collective well-being; and (4) households (poye in plural, foyré in singular) composed of 250	  
relational atomic units of people tied by blood or by marriage (Wane, Touré and Ancey, 2009). 251	  
For the fieldwork, we focused on the borehole of Thiel, which is a structuring or keystone 252	  
element of pastoral and agropastoral activity in this area. The first phase of the fieldwork 253	  
involved updating an existing database built in 2006–2007 with a census of pastoral and 254	  
agropastoral encampments dependent on this borehole (Wane, Camara, Ancey, Joly and Kâ, 255	  
2009). This complete database of 163 encampments provides basic information, such as the 256	  
names and surnames of the encampment head, his ethnicity, the geographical coordinates, and 257	  
herd composition by species. This updated database facilitates the definition of a 258	  
representative sampling of the socio-demographic diversity of the Thiel site. In 2013, our 259	  
investigation covered 120 encampments, which from a statistical point of view should 260	  
represent a margin of error of 4.61 percent and a confidence level of 95 percent. 261	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From this initial investigation, we found that only 80 encampments among the 120 262	  
encampments (67 percent) produce peanuts. Of these 80 encampments, only 22 have women 263	  
as owners of peanut processors. We interviewed the household heads of these 80 264	  
encampments, as well as 22 women who were peanut processors. Investigations in these 120 265	  
encampments will allow us to identify the real position of producers (in terms of influence) 266	  
from Thiel in the peanut value chain, calculate the added value created at each node, analyse 267	  
the interactions between the peanut value chain actors, and identify bottlenecks in order to 268	  
provide alternative interventions to improve the value chain. To achieve these goals, we 269	  
conducted interviews with other key value chain actors: three big collectors, three important 270	  
middlemen and nine haulers.  271	  
II- POSITION OF PEANUT PRODUCERS IN THE VALUE CHAIN: 272	  
SOLID SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS BUT WEAK TECHNICAL AND 273	  
ECONOMIC INTERCONNECTIONS 274	  
Using descriptive statistics, we first present some overall features of peanut activity at the 275	  
agropastoral site of Thiel. We then highlight what seems to be the main difficulty for the 276	  
producers: Technical cooperation and knowledge sharing are seriously limited. Finally, we 277	  
describe the asymmetry in the distribution of power among the stakeholders of the value 278	  
chain. 279	  
Overall features of peanut activity 280	  
In 2012, the production of peanuts in Thiel was carried out at four sites in the southwest of the 281	  
rural community near agricultural areas (Thiel Seerere, Moola, Darou-Nahim-Nguer and 282	  
Siilat). Nearly 95 percent of agropastoralists create value from their primary crop production; 283	  
the remaining 5 percent produce crops exclusively for self-consumption. However, the overall 284	  
value is still unevenly distributed among producers (Gini index: 0.65). Only a small number 285	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of agropastoralists manage to capture significant value creation, and 90 percent of them 286	  
receive half of the total value added along the value chain. 287	  
Almost all agropastoralists (95 percent) create value by selling at markets, and they generate 288	  
162 XOF or each kilogram of peanut product, which represents 29 percent of the total added 289	  
value per kilogram obtained. The middlemen of Touba contribute more by providing 177 290	  
XOF (32 percent) towards the formation of the overall added value, processing women 291	  
contribute 146 XOF (27 percent) per kilogram of peanut processed to oil, and collectors 292	  
contribute 63 XOF (12 percent).  293	  
 Figure 3 - Contribution of each group of actors to the formation of the overall value 294	  
 295	  
Sources: authors 296	  
The dominance of middlemen in the formation of the added value is explained by their 297	  
monopoly position in the market. They are price-makers and thus have the power to set the 298	  
purchase price at which they buy peanuts from growers and the price at which they sell. They 299	  
are in high demand, and agropastoralists use them to sell their products. The middlemen are in 300	  
theory able to make an option on the total production. 301	  
In the process of peanut production, the producers of Thiel use peanuts as seed and fertilizer. 302	  
An important proportion of the peanuts used for seed comes from purchases made by public 303	  
authorities or middlemen (89 percent), but they also come from stocks after harvest. Bearing 304	  
in mind the lack of flexibility in government administrative procedures, seed obtained from 305	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middlemen is more available and accessible for 58 percent of agropastoralists. In addition, 44 306	  
percent of producers are supplied from the public support units, and a similar proportion uses 307	  
stock; however, the ability to use stock depends on the quality and quantity of the previous 308	  
crop year. Few farmers (1 percent) declared getting seeds from their neighbourhoods. 309	  
Groundnut cultivation in Thiel is largely dependent on the volumes of seed and to a lesser 310	  
extent on the quantities of fertilizer used, as well as the amount of labour and livestock 311	  
available. The villages, which get large quantities of seed, experience higher performance. A 312	  
number of agropastoralists (30 percent) only use fertilizers and labour to cultivate, whereas a 313	  
very large proportion (80 percent) use cattle to till the land for growing peanuts. The latter 314	  
situation is not surprising because the area is dominated by agropastoral activities.  315	  
Seed prices vary depending on the suppliers. The average price fixed by the government is 316	  
225 XOF/kg. However, the average price from other suppliers is 433 XOF/Kg and, at times, 317	  
the price reaches 800 XOF/Kg. Fluctuations in current prices fixed by middlemen depend on 318	  
the quality of the previous crop year and prices of inventories and influence the supply of crop 319	  
seeds from agropastoralists, as well as from those who are engaged in farming. The main 320	  
uncertainty of the government’s supplies derives from the uncertainty of their ability to 321	  
provide sufficient quantities and quality at the right moment. Although the prices offered by 322	  
the government are relatively stable due to a form of implicit subsidy, there are some 323	  
logistical constraints in the distribution channel. Sahelian agropastoralists react to fluctuating 324	  
prices by combining various supply sources, including the government, the middlemen and/or 325	  
their own stocks. 326	  
Social network analysis of the peanut value chain 327	  
The matrix of social networks, which represents the positions of the different players in the 328	  
value chain, shows that the bigger the square, the more important the requests from actors to 329	  
any one given actor.  330	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Middlemen from Touba (in yellow) are the most requested actors and have a dominant role in 331	  
the peanut value chain. It seems that all the 120 investigated farmers sell to one of the three 332	  
middlemen, who are in an oligopsony situation. Considering past interactions, most farmers 333	  
seem to be conservatively attached to at least one of these three middlemen.  334	  
In fact, there is perhaps hardly any support for or transfer of technical and cultural practices 335	  
among the agropastoralists themselves. Only agropastoralists from Thiel Seerere (in red) and 336	  
Moola (in green) share knowledge on their agricultural practices. The others do not help each 337	  
other; they almost all consider agricultural production as secondary to livestock activities. 338	  
Cooperation in disseminating knowledge, understanding of practices and cultivation 339	  
techniques could help minimise input quantities and costs in light of current conditions and 340	  
help reduce post-harvest losses. 341	  
Figure 4 - Relationships among actors in the peanut value chain of Thiel 342	  
 343	  
Source: authors 344	  
 345	  
However, overall in the rural community of Thiel, there are very few technical and economic 346	  
links. This was discovered by measuring the density of the value chain, which accounted for 347	  
only 3 percent of the overall potential links. Social links are also very important as revealed 348	  
by almost all interviewees. 349	  
Influential power of peanut value chain actors 350	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To thoroughly represent the influence of each actor in the value chain, we use a graph (Figure 351	  
6, here) that is supported by questions summarised in Table 1. Thus, the first axis 352	  
summarises all the information contained in the data. Indeed, from the left to the right of this 353	  
axis, we pass from actors that have modalities related to influential individuals to actors that 354	  
have modalities for non-influential individuals. Therefore, using the first axis ordering 355	  
consistency (FAOC-I) criterion, the first axis is sufficient to characterise the actors according 356	  
to their level of influence. 357	  
Figure 5 – Capabilities transmission among producers 358	  
 359	  
Source: authors 360	  
There are two types of individuals: those attracted by modalities that characterise an 361	  
influential individual, and those attracted by modalities of the variables specific to a non-362	  
influential individual (refer to Table 1 for the variables). The individuals who are on the 363	  
side of negative abscissa participate in pricing the inputs; they are not obliged to buy if the 364	  
price of inputs is high (i.e., they do not depend on the market). These individuals fix or 365	  
contribute to fixing the sale price, and they are not obliged to sell if the price is low. They 366	  
master the market and know the final destination of the product. These characteristics are 367	  
typical for an influential individual in a value chain.  368	  
	   18	  
However, the non-influential individuals must buy even if the price of the inputs is high. The 369	  
sale prices of their products are fixed, and they must sell even if the price is low. Finally, they 370	  
do not master the market or know the final destination of their products. They are real price 371	  
takers, and their modalities are those of individuals who have little influence within the value 372	  
chain. 373	  
Figure 6 – Influence levels of the different nodes of the peanut value chain 374	  
 
Source: authors 375	  
The main actors of the value chain are all in very different environments. The middlemen of 376	  
Touba act within a vast market, with many agents coming from several cities of Senegal or 377	  
from abroad (Morocco, Vietnam, the Ukraine and China). The agropastoralists also deal with 378	  
the middlemen of Touba if they cannot sell in the local market of Thiel. The processing 379	  
women and the collectors, for whom intermediary activities are not a priority, are in the same 380	  
position. Therefore, the middlemen of Touba have a larger market share and are the dominant 381	  
actors in the value chain. They even have equipment for post-harvest crop processing, such as 382	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machines for hulling and the capacity to recruit personnel. On the contrary, agropastoralists 383	  
and processing women have little capital with which to purchase equipment and machines or 384	  
to hire competent personnel. The middlemen of Touba, the collectors and some processing 385	  
women have the modalities characteristic of an influential individual. This is explained by the 386	  
fact that Touba is considered the heart of the peanut market in Senegal. The middlemen 387	  
completely master the market and buy the crops for the prices they have set, even if they 388	  
consider the prices fixed by other middlemen. 389	  
The collectors can buy the products supplied by agropastoralists with more competitive prices 390	  
because they expect that some of the agropastoralists must sell to meet their daily 391	  
consumption needs. Therefore, the balance of power gives no choice to agropastoralists 392	  
because they have low production volumes as well as weak financial and economical 393	  
capacity, although some producers can be influential. Influential producers use their stock to 394	  
sow and sell it only if they perceive favourable prices. They seem to be more informed than 395	  
the others. 396	  
The position of the processing women is mixed. Those who are on the positive side of the 397	  
abscissa are not influential; others are on the negative side and are influential. 398	  
The collectors, the middlemen of Touba, and to a lesser extent the processing women are the 399	  
most influential members of the peanut value chain of Thiel. On the other hand, agro- 400	  
pastoralists and haulers remain vulnerable. The indicator built on the multiple correspondence 401	  
analysis (MCA), which appears more precise in the identification of influential actors, 402	  
supports this result. Therefore, 80 percent of the processing women are influential within the 403	  
value chain. Only 22 percent of haulers are in this position. The producers are the most 404	  
vulnerable in the market: 80 percent do not have any influence in the value chain. 405	  
 406	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Capital is also very important in the development of a value chain: It reinforces the production 407	  
capacity of agropastoralists through the purchasing of seeds, materials and fertilizer, and it 408	  
helps middlemen practice product management and motivates them to buy more peanuts from 409	  
the producers. Access to capital assists the processing women in acquiring high-quality 410	  
process materials, which are also more adaptable and better adhere to health and safety 411	  
specifications.   412	  
In the rural community of Thiel, the agropastoralists do not have access to formal agricultural 413	  
credit. Only 29 percent of the peanut producers turn to financial credit. Among these 414	  
agropastoralists, 77 percent were somewhat or completely dissatisfied with the quality of 415	  
financial services, which are expensive and require prohibitive repayment conditions.  416	  
Most agropastoralists practice self-financing to buy seeds and fertilizer and/or to recruit 417	  
people. The processing women are in the same position because the decision to borrow from 418	  
financial operators depends on the position of the encampment chief and his creditworthiness. 419	  
The collectors also claim that inadequate capital is a barrier. According to them, one of the 420	  
principal ways to improve the peanut value chain is through access to credit. 421	  
III-    POPULATION-SPECIFIC DISCUSSION  422	  
In the background of relatively high risks and uncertainties that characterises the Sahelian 423	  
livestock production systems (d’Alessandro, Fall, Grey, Simpkin and Wane, 2015), 424	  
agropastoralists of Thiel also depend on peanut production to secure their livelihoods. The 425	  
peanut crop development in Thiel largely arises from its closeness to the Senegal groundnut 426	  
basin that influences agropastoralists’ engagement in these agricultural practices and 427	  
production. The agropastoral area of Thiel is inhabited mostly by three categories of 428	  
populations: the Seereer, the Wolofs and the Fulani. Each of these categories is characterised 429	  
by specific cultural practices that influence production systems. Functionally, peanut 430	  
production helps to distinguish between two groups. On the one hand, the group composed of 431	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both the Seereer and the Wolofs is keener to practice agriculture for cultural and economic 432	  
reasons, although livestock remains a form of insurance and patrimony. On the other hand, the 433	  
group exclusively composed of Fulani is mainly oriented towards animal production and 434	  
practices agriculture as a secondary or diversification activity. For all these categories of 435	  
population, the peanut crop is used as is and/or processed into cooking oil by women 436	  
agropastoralists for self-consumption and marketing, whereas crop residues are destined for 437	  
animal feed. In this overall context, which is also characterised by relatively weak production 438	  
volumes, market fundamentals are not the main drivers for peanut crop production, given its 439	  
multiple uses. There are some similarities with herd management in extensive and pastoral 440	  
systems, in which the objective function of producers is a composite utility function that 441	  
balances their short-term consumption needs and long-term herd building strategy to meet 442	  
future consumption needs (Fadiga, 2013). For these reasons, they participate in market(s) in 443	  
an opportunistic way (Wane, Ancey and Touré, 2010). However, the peanut crop remains key 444	  
for household livelihoods and provides them with food, animal feed and a cash crop. In this 445	  
regard, the peanut value chain analysis displays the overall context shaping the actions of the 446	  
Fulani agropastoralists, who are mostly hindered and characterised by a lack of incentives to 447	  
perform adequately or at least at the levels reached by others ethnic groups, such as the 448	  
Seereer.  449	  
For the Fulani, the low standard of living and acute need for cash could lead them to sell their 450	  
weak production even without adequate and expected market prices. This situation is 451	  
exacerbated by the poor supply of financial services (for instance, in the area, there is only 452	  
one financial structure, and it provides predatory short-term loans with very high interest 453	  
rates). In addition, infrastructure is weak, with all-weather poor rural roads driving up 454	  
transportation costs. Furthermore, the strong dependency on rainfed agriculture constitutes an 455	  
aggravating factor in a context of climate change. In such a situation, instead of trying to sell 456	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to the middlemen who usually propose higher prices, agropastoralists end up limiting the area 457	  
in which they sell their production. In addition, the lack of incentive to engage in such a 458	  
demanding journey to reach the main market forces agropastoralists to rely heavily on some 459	  
collectors present in the local market. Finally, their lack of knowledge regarding peanut 460	  
production in comparison to the other group (the Seerere and Wolofs), as well as the frailty of 461	  
technical cooperation, does not facilitate the emergence of an enabling environment for 462	  
producers, who remain the weaker node of the peanut value chain.  463	  
IV-    CONCLUSION WITH OPTIONS TO MOVE FORWARD 464	  
In these conditions, improving the peanut value chain in Thiel requires taking action to boost 465	  
the agropastoralists’ position—locally and eventually globally—to refine the economic 466	  
environment. 467	  
At the producer level 468	  
One of the main points highlighted in this case study is the weakness of the economic, 469	  
technical and organizational cooperation between producers, despite their claim to be 470	  
developing strong social relationships. Thus, the capacity building of the producers should be 471	  
more focused on pragmatic goals. For instance, it could be decided to gradually increase the 472	  
level of technical cooperation and the sharing of knowledge in agricultural practices. In this 473	  
case, it could be interesting to inclusively build from 3 percent of the overall potential 474	  
economic and technical cooperation towards more significant levels. 475	  
At the value chain level 476	  
Public policies could help by providing a better integration of heterogeneous knowledge 477	  
(including local scales) and by orienting agricultural research toward development outcomes. 478	  
Due to the economic dominance of livestock activities in this semi-arid area and the 479	  
importance of food in household budgets, the main option is to intensify crop-livestock 480	  
activities to obtain viable and sustainable production systems (McIntire, Bourzat and Pingali, 481	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1992). This implies the increased use of external inputs, adaptation of agricultural innovations 482	  
to local conditions, and the provision of incentives for smallholder farmers in order to 483	  
strengthen their production capacity, build trust along the value chains and create a favourable 484	  
business environment.  485	  
One concrete way to attempt this inclusive objective could be to ensure that the actors of the 486	  
value chain benefit from moving towards the establishment of genuine inter-professional 487	  
actions through a technical, organizational, managerial and management innovation platform. 488	  
This platform, through which all stakeholders will be represented, should be a framework that 489	  
considers different expectations, identifies the main constraints within the value chain, and 490	  
allows the co-construction of innovations and the facilitation of their appropriation, which 491	  
should include collective sharing of best practices in production and management. 492	  
The innovation platform members will be notably responsible for the (i) development of rules 493	  
for the micro sector (participation requirements, definition of floor prices to maintain 494	  
economic viability, reference prices, and technical specifications); (ii) the validation of quality 495	  
conventions for inputs and final products; (iii) the capacity building of stakeholders through 496	  
technical and technological training programs to increase agricultural yields, as well as post-497	  
production training in terms of management and organization (business plans, networking, 498	  
central purchasing units, etc.) to improve agricultural productivity; (iv) the development of 499	  
credit and insurance systems adapted to crop-livestock systems and (v) the implementation of 500	  
market information systems to reduce information and position asymmetries. 501	  
In terms of policies, public authorities should consolidate existing producer organizations and 502	  
networking across permanent frameworks for consultation, exchanges, collaboration and 503	  
learning. They should design sustainable intensification options, minimise losses and wastes 504	  
in peanut value chains and systematise impact assessments of major solutions through a 505	  
gender lens, given that the impact of gender on these issues should be considered as 506	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improvement strategies are developed.  507	  
Finally, this study stresses the role and importance of social networks, which could be more 508	  
finely analysed to design improvements for the training and organization of producers. 509	  
Therefore, combining the traditional value chain approach with social network analysis is 510	  
crucial to move forward towards resilient systems. 511	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